Ottoman Society 1453-1700

Ottoman society was stable, highly stratified and militarized. This society is best described in terms of the reaya (ruled) and the askeris (rulers) Peasants, artisans, and merchants composed the reaya class and fighters, bueracrats, and admnistrators composed the askeris class. This division of society mirrors Tusi's (13th century Muslim theoretician) vision of an ideal Muslim society in which each sector is carefully walled off from another and in which Men of the Sword and the Pen ruled over Men of Negotiation and Husbandry. However, Ottoman society was distinct from earlier Muslim societies because of the rigidity of its social structure. The only routes for advancement into the reaya into the askeris was either through the timar system or the ghulam system.

The purpose of the timar system was to provide the sultan capable provincial administrators and a reserve fighting force at low cost. A timar was a plot of land normally the size of a village. A timar coule be acquired through battlefield valor followed by a successful petition. A timariot's peacetime responsibilities was to manage his village, keep track of the population, protect it from bandits, settle local disputes, and collect taxes. A timariot's wartime responsibility was to serve in the army fully equipped by using the surplus tax proceeds from the timar. Every several years, a cadastrel (survey) is undertaken of all the timars in the empire. Besides keeping track of the revenues gained from the provinces and the amount of fighting men (timars) the sultan could expect in times of war, the cadastrel also made sure that timariots did not overtax their peasants.

Lording over the timars are the sankukliks and over the sankuks are the beglerbeks. The beglerbik's relationship with the sankukliks is identical to the sankuklik's relationship with the timars. The sankukliks were both the military and the civilian superiors of the timariots. Their responsibility was to manage and pay for the provincial bueracracies, to oversee several timars, and to settle disputes between timariots. In war, a sankuklik was expected to provide important army equipment such as field kitchens and carriages and to provide equipment for himself and for several others. The main difference between a sankuklik and a timariot is education. A timariot can be relatively uneducated whereas a sankuklik must know the traditions of High Islam. To move up the timar system required education and a powerful patron.

The other method of social advancement was the ghulam or military slavery system. The ghulam system begins with the devshirme in which janissaries go to Christian villages (traditionally in the Balkans) and collect 1 in 40 boys. Each boy must be mentally and physically competent and cannot be only childs or have important societal skills. The selected boys are then taken to Istanbul where they are educated and Islamicized. This process of education can last from 2-8 years. A series of chikmas (tests) weed out the incompetents. Most become janissaries, some become siphaphis (household cavalry of the sultan) and the remaining become bueracrats, sankukliks, beglerbiks, and sometimes even grand vizier. The average janissary was similar to the timariots in that they only learned the arts of war. Like the timar system, successful advancement in the ghulam system required a powerful patron and learing the high traditions of Islam (calligraphy, mathematics, poetry, artistry, and philosophy).

The purpose of the timar and ghulam system was the creation of a capable and loyal administration and army. During the upswing of the Ottoman empire from 1400s-1566, these systems worked like a charm. Because of the timar and ghulam system, the Ottoman empire was able to survive periods of trouble (e.g. 1402-1451) and to expand from Tabriz to Vienna and from Kars to Morrocco. However, cracks began appearing after Sulieman's death in 1566. The three pressures that caused these cracks were inflation, expanding population and stagnation. Corruption and the creation of vested interests independent of the sultan weakened the empire even more.

The cause of inflation was the influx of silver from the New World to Europe and the Middle East. Attempts by the empire to control inflation was unsuccessful as prices tripled during 1600-1650. Inflation disrupted the Ottoman economy. A weakened economy, in combination with a population boom, led to the creation of an underclass of landless peasants and unemployed urban poor who served as fuel for revolts and unrest. Revolts broke out, tax revenues decreased, the central treasury ran out of money, and the timar system broke down when many timariots could no longer collect the necessary taxes to maintain their position. In conjunction with the breakdown in the economy was a breakdown in justice. The new owners of the timars (janissaries and members of the reaya), unconstrained by the cadastrel survey that kept taxes in check, raised the already oppressive taxes even higher, which had the opposite effect of depressing tax revenues even more. The Ottoman empire was caught in a vicious cycle of recession, revolts, higher taxes, and even more recession.

In the past, the Ottoman empire had survived similar doldrums with military expansion. Military expansion restocked the treasury with loot, siphoned off unruly elements of the population, and provided the empire with new lands to administer and to exploit. However, Ottoman expansion had reached its peak by the beginning of the 17th century. Because of a variety of military, admnistrative, logisitical, and technological reasons, the Ottoman army was defunct and was slowly being eclipsed in the 17th century by a resurgent Europe and Russia. Ottoman expansion was checked in the Balkans and in Morrocco by the Austrians and Spanish respectively. In the Crimea, the Ottomans and their Tartar allies slowly lost ground to the Moscovites. The only region where the Ottomans had substantial military success was in the East against the Safavids. However, the Ottomans could not maintain their successes because of logistical difficulties and had to eventually give up their lands in Iran and return back to Baghdad.

Reforms finally came in 1656 with the beginning of the Kuprili era. Grand vizier Kuprili and subsequent Grand viziers attacked the corruption and the nepotism that were clogging the Ottoman system. They replaced incapable officials, limited corruption, and weakened the powerful families in Istanbul. Another major element of the reforms was to return to the past by getting rid of the new innovations, which the viziers believed to be the root of the troubles of Ottoman society. However, despite bringing about a short burst of prosperity, the Kuprili reforms had limited effect. First, despite these reforms, the Ottoman empire lost control over the provinces of Egypt and the Maghrib. Families of janissaries, allied with the leading elements of urban society (rich merchants and the ulama) took over the provinces' administration and tax collection systems and created their own mini-state within the Ottoman empire. Second, these reforms did not address the fundamental problems in Ottoman society (inflation, overpopulation, and stagnation). Third, these reforms may have stopped Ottoman decline at the cost of replacing it with stagnation. This stagnation would ultimately allow the Europeans to eclipse the Ottomans in virtually everything, which would lead to the final demise of the Ottoman empire.

Ottoman society was highly militarized, stratified, and stable. However, precisely because of these traits, Ottoman society was unable to adapt and would ultimately crack under the strain of the new pressures from Europe and America. The very strenghts of Ottoman society was the cause of its decline.

Early Islamic Succession Crisis

The Rashadun and early Umayyad period had three succession crisis. 2 of these 3 succession crisis had great religious and political ramifications. The second crisis ended the Rashadun period and marked the beginning of the Umayyad period and the third marked the final schism between Sunnis and Shiites. There were two root to these crisis. The first root was that Muhammed never named a successor or described an algorithm for choosing his successor. Consequently, successors of Muhammed had to turn either to tribal methods of choosing a successor or to brute force. The second root of the crisis were the political/religious tensions of the Muslim community. Despite the fact that everyone believed in the same religion, the Muslim community was fragile and could easily shatter.

The first succession crisis did not influence Islamic history much. However, this crisis is important because it illustrates the tribal nature and the fragility of early Islamic society. This crisis begun after Muhammed's death in 632 AD. During his lifetime, Muhammed had been able to create an Arabic empire by converting the different tribes and cities of Arabia to Islam and uniting them under a common banner. However, some of these tribes held the mistaken belief that Muhammed was immortal. Disillusioned by Muhammed's death, they broke away and become apostates. The leading Muslims, facing the prospect of the dissolution of their empire, turned to the tribal traditions of selecting a leader and quickly convened a council that elected Abu Bakr as the first Caliph. Abu Bakr spent the next 2 years fighting and bringing the apostate tribes back into the fold.

The second succession crisis was very important in Islamic history because it ended the Rashadun period. In the intervening years between Muhammed's death (632 AD) and Uthman's assassination (656 AD), three major groups vyed for power. These 3 groups can be very loosely described in geographic terms. The first group was the Medina-Kufah axis. Members of this group included Muhammed's family and included the first converts to Islam. They believed that because they were the first converts, they had the right to lead the Muslim community. The second group were the leading aristocrats (Quraish) of Mecca. They believed they should be the heirs of Muhammed because they were the most capable. The third group was the army, which had by 656 AD conquered Syria, Egypt, and much of the Sassasanian empire (Iran and Iraq). They didn't care who was the Caliph so long as they could keep the spoils of war and be allowed to rule the lands that they had conquered.

These tensions were papered over by the Caliphs between Muhammed's death and Uthman. Both Abu Bakr and Omar were capable politicians and admnistrators who oversaw Muslim expansion abroad while keeping the politcal tension at home in check. Both were also able to appoint a successor or appoint a council to name a successor before their deaths. However, these tensions would erupt into a war of succession after Uthman's assassination. Uthman, even though a devout Muslim, was a poor administrator and an even worse politician. His nepotism angered a portion of the army who then assassinated Uthman in 656 AD. The army then handed the Caliphate to Ali, the leader of the Medina-Kufah faction. These actions immediately sparked a succession crisis between Medina and Mecca. A fourth group led by Muwaiyah, the nephew of Uthman and the governor of Syria, joined into the fray. The net result of these conflicts was that Ali became the Caliph. However, after Ali's assassination by a former Kharijite supporter, the Muslim community, tired of this incessant warring, handed the Caliphate to Muwaiyah who became Caliph-by-default (661 AD). This action marked the end of the Rashadun period and the beginning of the Umayyad dynasty.

Besides ending the Rashudan period, the ascension of Muwaiyah also marked the beginning of the dynastic tradition of Islamic empires. Future Islamic empires would copy Muwaiyah's action of handing the Caliphate to a family member. The Rashadun tradition of appointing the most amenable or capable member of the Muslim community as Caliph was ended when Muwaiyah appointed his son Yazid as the next Caliph. This decision not only had great political ramifications, but also had great religious ramifications as well. Some members of the Muslim community, the Shiites in particular, had accepted Muwaiyah as Caliph under the assumption that he would stick to the Rashadun method of succession. When it turned out otherwise, the Shiites rebelled and Husayn, the son of Ali and Fatima marched to Karbala in 680 AD in order to raise an army against Yazid. This army never materialized. Instead, Husayn and his small band of supporters was surrounded by Yazid's army and was promptly massacred. Husayn's martyrdom marks the final schism between Shiism and Sunnism celebrated by the Shiites in their holiday of Ashura.

The Rashadun and early Ummayad succession crisis were very important in Islamic history. These succession crisis illustrates the fragile political and religious nature of the Muslim state and marks two of the most important events in Islamic history. They were also unique in that these crisis were not dynastic in nature. All future succession crisis would be dynastic and would, in some ways, be no different then the succession crisis of other empires of in the world.